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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Mr. and Mrs. Alcazar filed their original Notice of Appeal 
on January 17,2007. The trial court vacated its original judgment and entered judgment on 
May 21, 2007. A timely First Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on June 4, 2007. See 
Order of The Utah Court of Appeals dated June 6, 2007. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(j) and 4, Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in declining to follow the holdings of the Utah Court 
of Appeals in Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) and Evans v. Doty, 
824 P.2d460,462 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992)? Do plaintiffs 
in medical negligence cases still have the right, established by these cases, to voir dire of 
potential jurors on their exposure to reports of medical negligence cases and the impact of 
medical negligence cases, including the purported detrimental effect that awards in these 
cases have on insurance premiums, the availability of insurance, and the ability and 
willingness of medical providers to practice medicine? 
2. Does the trial court's disallowance of voir dire inquiry on the exposure 
of prospective jurors to reports about medical negligence cases constitute reversible error, 
where plaintiffs in a medical negligence action were unable to discover prospective jurors' 
exposure to and biases from such reports? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Stare decisis is a cardinal principle of American jurisprudence, including the 
jurisprudence of the State of Utah. A lower court is bound to follow precedent established 
by a higher court. 
Also, as set forth by the Utah Court of Appeals, 
We review challenges to the trial court's management of jury 
voir dire under an abuse of discretion standard. Evans v. Doty, 
824 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 
1383 (Utah 1992); Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 457-58 (Utah 
App. 1989). Generally, the trial court is afforded broad 
discretion in conducting voir dire, "but that discretion must be 
exercised in favor of allowing discovery of biases or prejudice 
in prospective jurors." State v. Hall, 797 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990). See also State 
v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 797-98 (Utah 1991) (noting 
importance of voir dire process in eliminating bias and 
prejudice from trial proceedings). This court will overturn a 
trial court's discretionary rejection of voir dire questions only 
upon a showing that "the abuse of discretion rose to the level 
of reversible error." Hall, 797 P.2d at 472. A trial court 
commits reversible error when, '"considering the totality of 
the questioning, counsel [is not] afforded an adequate 
opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate 
jurors.'" Evans, 824 P.2d at 462 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988)). 
Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this medical negligence action, the trial court declined to follow the Utah 
Court of Appeals' precedents in Barrett and Evans, supra, and rejected the Alcazars' 
requested voir dire questions designed to elicit prospective jurors exposure to and biases 
from reports and discussions of medical negligence cases. The jury was then empaneled, and 
after trial between November 13-16, 2006, returned a defense verdict. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. At 1:40 a.m. on May 4, 2002, forty-six-year-old, Plaintiff Crescendo 
Alcazar presented to the University of Utah Emergency Department ("ED") complaining of 
chest pain. R. 318, R. 1316. 
2. Mr. Alcazar explained that he had been experiencing chest pain 
intermittently for the past three days. R. 319, R. 31316. 
3. The ED noted that Mr. Alcazar's pain was in the left chest, of a burning 
quality, associated with shortness of breath, and had reached a severity of 8-9/10. R. 3110, 
R. 1316. 
4. The ED noted that Mr. Alcazar's chest pain occurred at rest, that there 
were no exacerbating or relieving factors, and that left arm tingling was an associated 
symptom. R. 3111, R. 1316. 
5. Defendants failed to consider heart disease in their differential diagnosis 
and failed to perform laboratory tests to rule out an impending heart attack. Id. 114. 
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6. Defendants diagnosed Mr. Alcazar with "atypical chest pain" and sent 
him home. R. 3115, R. 1319. 
7. Within 12 hours of being sent home, Mr. Alcazar suffered a heart attack. 
Id. 116 
8. Mr. and Mrs. Alcazar commenced action on December 23,2003. R. 1-
6. 
9. One week prior to the start of trial, the Alcazars submitted Plaintiffs' 
First Amended Requested Voir Dire of Potential Jurors. R. 359-363, Addendum 1. 
10. The Alcazars' requested voir dire included the following questions 
designed to elicit potential jurors' exposure to reports and discussions about medical 
negligence cases and the so-called "medical malpractice crisis", including the purported 
detrimental effect that awards in these cases have on insurance premiums, the availability of 
insurance, and the ability and willingness of medical providers to practice medicine: 
Question No. 1. Do you believe a lawsuit is a proper 
method of resolving disputes concerning compensation for negligent 
medical care? Ostler v. Albina Transfer Company, Inc., 781 P.2d 445 
(Utah 1989). Please explain [in chambers]. 
Question No. 2. Have any of you watched, read, or 
heard anything that suggests a "lawsuit crisis" or the need for "tort 
reform"? Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 101 (Utah App. 1993); Evans 
v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991). Please explain [in chambers]. 
a. Do you think the article, program, etc. made some 
good points? 
b. Did you agree with the points made? Please 
explain [in chambers]. 
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c. Would you be inclined to reduce the damage 
award, if any, in this case, because of what you have watched, read or 
heard? Please explain [in chambers]. 
Question No. 3. Have any of you watched, read or 
heard anything which suggests that jury verdicts are too high or 
unreasonable? What have you seen, heard or read? (To be asked of 
jurors in chambers.) 
a. Do you personally believe that jury verdicts are 
unreasonable? 
b. Do you believe that monetary limits should be 
placed upon the amounts which a jury can award to an individual who 
sues for personal injuries? 
Question No. 5. Have any of you watched, read, or 
heard anything to indicate that jury verdicts for plaintiffs in personal 
injury or medical malpractice cases result in higher insurance 
premiums, effect the availability of insurance, or result in higher 
medical costs for consumers? Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 101 (Utah 
App. 1993); Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991). Please 
explain [in chambers]. 
a. What do you remember about it? Please explain 
[in chambers], 
b. Do you think the article, program, etc. made some 
good points? Please explain [in chambers]. 
c. Do you personally believe that jury verdicts for 
plaintiffs in personal injury cases result in higher insurance premiums 
or effect the availability of insurance? Please explain [in chambers]. 
Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 101 (Utah App. 1993); Evans v. Doty, 
824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991). 
Question No. 8. Do any of you have any negative 
feelings about lawyers who seek compensation for those who have 
suffered medical malpractice? Please explain. 
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Question No. 11. Have you or any of your close 
relatives or friends worked or do you or they now work in any aspect 
of the insurance industry (insurance salesman, employee of an 
insurance company, adjuster, underwriter, or anything similar)? Please 
explain. If yes, would that effect the way you might view this case? 
Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991). 
Question No. 15. Have you or a close friend or relative 
ever been sued in a medical malpractice lawsuit? Please explain. 
R. 359-363, Addendum 1. 
11. At a pretrial conference on November 7, 2006 the court reviewed and 
ruled on the Alcazars' requested voir dire of potential jurors. R. 560. 
12. The court ruled that it would not give any of the Alcazars' questions 
designed to discover potential jurors' exposure to reports of medical negligence cases and 
a medical malpractice crisis, including the questions quoted above, Nos. 1,2,3,5, 8,11, and 
15 and their sub-parts. R. 560, pp. 3-7, Addendum 2. 
13. When the Alcazars attempted to persuade the court to give the questions, 
arguing their need and the right, under Utah appellate court law, to discover potential jurors' 
exposure to reports of medical negligence cases, the court declined to follow that law, 
expressing a different philosophical approach to voir dire. R. 560, pp. 7-10, Addendum 2. 
14. During voir dire, prospective jurors were not questioned about their 
exposure to reports or discussions of medical negligence cases, including the purported 
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detrimental effect that awards in these cases have on insurance premiums, the availability of 
insurance, and the ability and willingness of doctors to practice medicine. R. 758, pp. 3-122. 
15. The jury was then empaneled and the case tried between November 13-
16, 2006, which resulted in a defense verdict. R. 419-20. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. 
The trial court erred during voir dire of the matter at bar, by declining to follow 
the holdings of the Utah Court of Appeals in Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96,98 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) and Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460,462 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 
1383 (Utah 1992). These cases establish the right of plaintiffs in medical negligence actions 
to discover exposure of prospective jurors to reports and discussions of medical negligence 
cases (a.k.a. "medical malpractice crisis"), including the purported detrimental effect these 
cases have on insurance premiums, the availability of insurance, and the ability and 
willingness of medical providers to practice medicine. 
Rejecting the requested voir dire that the Alcazars had prepared pursuant to 
Barrett and Evans, the trial court believed the better approach was not to ask such questions 
so as not to suggest anything to prospective jurors about these much-discussed issues. 
However, under the doctrine of stare decisis, the trial court did not have discretion to ignore 
the Utah Court of Appeals' precedents and follow its own philosophy on jury selection. 
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POINT II. 
The trial court's failure to give the Alcazars' requested voir dire or otherwise 
elicit prospective jurors' exposure to reports and discussion of medical negligence cases was 
prejudicial error, since the Alcazars' right to the informed exercise of their peremptory 
challenges was substantially impaired. Barrett at 103. The voir dire performed by the trial 
court did not compensate for this failure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STARE DECISIS REQUIRED THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
QUESTION PROSPECTIVE JURORS ON THEIR 
EXPOSURE TO REPORTS OF MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE 
CASES AND THEIR EFFECT. 
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, a trial court errs when it fails to abide by 
the precedents established by a higher court in the jurisdiction. The trial court erred in the 
matter at bar by declining to follow the precedents established by the Utah Court of Appeals 
in Barrett and Evans. These cases hold that plaintiffs in medical negligence cases must be 
allowed to discover whether prospective jurors have read, seen, or heard information on the 
impact of medical negligence cases or tort reform: 
We hold only that in cases such as this one, the plaintiff 
is entitled during voir dire to elicit information from 
prospective jurors as to whether they have read or heard 
information generally on medical negligence or tort 
reform, and to follow up with appropriate questions if 
affirmative responses are received. 
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The trial court's failure to ask prospective jurors 
threshold questions sufficient to elicit information on the 
jurors' possible exposure to tort-reform and medical 
negligence information prevented appellant from 
detecting possible bias and from intelligently exercising 
his peremptory challenges. The trial court's limitation of 
voir dire questioning substantially impaired appellant's 
right to the informed exercise of his peremptory 
challenges, and therefore constitutes reversible error. The 
judgment in favor of appellee is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for a new trial. 
Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). See also, Evans v. Doty, 824 
P.2d 460, 467(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Prior to selection of the jury in the case at bar, the Alcazars submitted requested 
voir dire questions to the court, based upon the holdings in Barrett and Evans, to discover 
prospective jurors' exposure to published reports and discussions of medical negligence 
cases, and the possible biases resulting therefrom. R. 359-362, Addendum 1. However, the 
court rejected all of the Alcazars' proposed voir dire in this regard. R. 560, pp. 3-7, 
Addendum 2. Explaining its rejection, the court stated its view that such questions were 
calculated to improperly influence the jury pool. R. 560, p. 8. When the Alcazars attempted 
to remind the trial court of their right to such voir dire and to explain the need for such voir 
dire, the court expressed a different philosophical approach, which meant remaining silent 
on the topic: 
MR. RATY: Could I - and I don't want to argue with 
you on this point, Your Honor -
THE COURT: Well then don't. 
MR. RATY: Then don't? Can I say one last thing. 
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THE COURT: If you want to make a record, go ahead. 
MR. RATY: Okay, just very briefly, I think there's a fine 
balance between suggesting things to the jury pool and 
discovering prejudices and biases, which would allow us to 
intelligently exercise our peremptory challenges, and I think that 
case law, Your Honor, and I've cited several of those cases, 
support the need, especially in our present climate so much 
discussion about doctors going out of business because of 
medical malpractice cases, and -
THE COURT: I mean do you want to tell the panel, are 
you worried about doctors going out of business because of 
medical malpractice? Is that the kind of thought you want to put 
in their mind? 
MR RATY: Well, what I'm afraid of is this -
THE COURT: You want to put in their mind that your 
medical costs are going to go up because of, you know, it's like 
saying to a kid don't put beans in your ears, you know, they're 
going to say, "Hey, that's an idea", you know, and that's what 
you're doing, and I think it can hurt the plaintiff as much as it 
can hurt the defendant and it makes, it creates kind of a random 
damage outcome that you can't predict, and again I've seen 
enough juries over the last 40 years, that you know, I think I 
know how they generally react and I think in this instance, as I 
said before, you will know which people to challenge 
peremptorily by the time we get to that point. 
R. 560, pp. 9:2-10:6. 
What the Alcazars' counsel was afraid of and tried to express to the court 
before being cut off, was that the so-called "medical malpractice crisis" has been so widely 
reported in the news media and so heavily discussed during political campaigns, that 
prospective jurors had likely already been exposed to such reports and information, and 
perhaps had developed the biases which seem so prevalent in society. It was important, and 
frankly, under Barrett and Evans, the Alcazars had the right to know whether prospective 
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jurors had read, heard, or seen such reports, and, if so, what the reports said, and what the 
prospective jurors thought about them. This information, as acknowledged by Barrett and 
Evans\ was critical to allow the Alcazars to intelligently exercise their peremptory challenges 
and possibly secure excuses for cause. Barrett at 102, Evans at 467. In Evans, the court 
explained, 
In tort cases, and more particularly in medical 
malpractice cases, we cannot ignore the reality that 
potential jurors may have developed tort-reform biases as 
a result of an overall exposure to such propaganda. 
Accordingly, in cases such as this one, the plaintiff has a 
legitimate interest in discovering which jurors may have 
read or heard information generally on medical 
negligence or tort reform.... 
Reason suggests that exposure to tort-reform propaganda 
may foster a subconscious bias within certain prospective 
jurors, and, had [plaintiff] been able to identify those 
jurors exposed to such propaganda, she could have more 
intelligently exercised her peremptory challenges. 
Evans at 467. (Citations omitted). In Barretty the court added, 
In light of the pervasive dissemination of tort-reform 
information, and the corresponding potential for general 
exposure to such information by potential jurors, a 
plaintiff is entitled to know which potential jurors, if any, 
have been so exposed. Plaintiff is entitled to such 
information absent any particular showing of specific 
campaigns, advertisements, or literature offered for the 
purpose of showing potential prejudice. Failure to ask 
such questions ignores the plaintiffs "need to gather 
information to assist in exercising . . . peremptory 
challenges." 
Barrett at 101. (Citations omitted). 
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True to its expressed intention, the court did not elicit any information from the 
prospective jurors about their exposure to reports and discussion of medical negligence cases. 
The court rejected all of the Alcazars' requested voir dire. The Alcazars' protestations 
apparently did, however, lead the court to ask one token question on the topic: "Has any of 
you or a close friend or relative personally formed an opinion either in favor of or opposed 
to tort reform or been a member of any organization that has?" R. 57:10-12. This, of course, 
was not the type of threshold question required by Barrett and Evans to discover what the 
prospective jurors had heard, read, or seen by way of reports and discussion of medical 
negligence cases and tort reform. It only asked jurors if they had formed an opinion in favor 
or opposed to tort reform. Not surprisingly, the only prospective-juror response elicited from 
asking the esoteric term "tort reform" in isolation was, "What is tort reform?" R. 758, p. 57: 
13. However, rather than explain what the term meant and then ask prospective jurors 
regarding their exposure to reports of a medical malpractice crisis, the court said simply, "I 
thought we'd get questions. If you don't know what it is, you don't need to worry about it, 
okay?" R. 758, p. 57:14-16. Thus ended the court's inquiry on prospective juror exposure 
to reports of medical negligence cases and their effect, and the Alcazars were left without any 
information on these important matters to intelligently exercise their peremptory challenges 
in their medical negligence case. 
The trial court violated stare decisis and erred by declining to engage in the 
voir dire required by Barrett and Evans. The court also abused whatever discretion it may 
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have had on the matter since "'that discretion must be exercised in favor of allowing 
discovery of biases or prejudice in prospective jurors.'" State v. Hall, 797 P.2d 470, 472 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990). See also State v. James, 819 P.2d 
781,797-98 (Utah 1991). The trial court's approach was the opposite, keeping biases and 
prejudices secret. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISALLOWANCE OF VOIR 
DIRE QUESTIONING ON ISSUES OF MEDICAL 
NEGLIGENCE CASES IS REVERSIBLE ERROR SINCE 
IT SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED THE ALCAZARS' 
RIGHT TO THE INFORMED EXERCISE OF THEIR 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES. 
In Barrett, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and 
remanded the case for a new trial. Barrett at 104. Rejecting the standard requirement that 
plaintiff show that an absence of error would have resulted in a different outcome, the court 
ruled that in the context of voir dire questioning, prejudicial error is shown if the plaintiffs 
right to the informed exercise of peremptory challenges has been substantially impaired: 
An appellant claiming that the trial court's unreasonable 
limitation of voir dire substantially impaired his ability to 
exercise peremptory challenges simply cannot prove, in the 
traditional way, that prejudice resulted from the error. Appellant 
cannot show with any certainty that had certain questions been 
asked, particular responses would have been received; that 
certain jurors would then have been challenged for cause or 
peremptorily; and that particular, more favorably predisposed 
jurors would have been seated instead, who would have 
deliberated to a different result. Accordingly, in this context, we 
apply the test enunciated in Hornsby: Prejudicial error is shown 
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if the appellant's right to the informed exercise of peremptory 
challenges has been "substantially impaired." 758 P.2d at 933. 
Barrett at 103. 
In reversing the trial court in Barrett, the court of appeals distinguished Evans, 
where the court had determined the trial court's error in limiting voir dire harmless. Evans 
at 468. The court noted that Evans must have been a "close call" and that the factors which 
must have permitted the Evans court to determine the voir dire problems there harmless, were 
not present in Barrett. Barrett at 103. These included the fact that the trial court in Evans 
actually mentioned articles and television programs to jurors and asked jurors whether they 
had strong feelings about lawsuits against doctors: 
Now, many of you have heard and read articles, and there have 
been television programs, with regard to negligence on the part 
of doctors. Do any of you have any strong feelings as a result of 
seeing or reading anything about medical negligence that would 
make it so that you couldn't be fair and impartial here today? 
Now do any of you have any strong feelings about anyone 
bringing a lawsuit against a doctor? 
Evans at 463. Significantly, in response to this questioning, two potential jurors indicated 
they could not be impartial, and they were excused for cause. Id. at 468. Barrett then noted, 
The record in this case, by contrast, reveals that despite 
appellant's submission of supplemental voir dire questions 
accompanied by a supporting memorandum, no pertinent 
questions regarding tort-reform and medical negligence issues 
were asked, even indirectly, nor were such matters even touched 
upon by the trial court. In view of our earlier Conclusion that 
appellant was denied an opportunity to ferret out jurors who had 
been exposed to tort-reform material, and was prevented from 
further questioning of such jurors, appellant's ability to 
-14-
intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges was 
substantially impaired. The factors which permitted the Evans 
court, in what must have been a close call, to determine that the 
voir dire problems there were harmless, are simply not present 
here. In the instant case, the overall voir dire was much less 
extensive. Moreover, in contrast to Evans, the trial court did not 
so much as mention the subject of articles and programs on 
medical negligence, nor did it verbalize the concept of lawsuits 
against doctors prompting discernible emotions. 
Barrett at 103. (Emphasis added). 
As in Barrett, in the case at bar, the trial court asked no meaningful question 
that would elicit disclosure by prospective jurors of exposure to information on medical 
negligence cases and their effect. Like Barrett, the court did not even comment about 
articles and television programs on medical negligence nor "verbalize the concept of lawsuits 
against doctors prompting discernible emotions." The court made clear its intention that no 
such matters be suggested to prospective jurors and it enforced that intention. It rejected all 
of Plaintiffs' proposed voir dire regarding what the jurors had read, heard, and/or seen about 
articles and programs on medical negligence, of doctors leaving the practice of medicine, or 
of rising malpractice and health insurance costs. Also, at side bar at the end of the court's 
in-court voir dire, the court again rebuffed the Alcazars' last-ditch pleas for Barrett and 
Evans voir dire. R. 650, 112. The court's approach violated the Utah Court of Appeals' 
holdings in Barrett and Evans, and substantially impaired the Alcazars' ability to the 
informed exercise of their peremptory challenges. 
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Undoubtedly, Appellees will respond that the trial court engaged in a thorough 
voir dire that should make up for rejection of the Alcazars' Barrett and Evans voir dire. This 
is not the case. The trial court's in-court voir dire was brief, and, more importantly, did not 
attempt to elicit, and did not elicit, anything about what the prospective jurors had read seen 
or heard on issues of medical negligence cases. R. 758, pp. 3-68. The court then had many 
of the prospective jurors back in chambers on an individual basis, to discuss myriad issues, 
including health problems of the jurors and their loved ones, hardships in serving, prejudices 
against smokers, prejudices against Hispanics, a fiance's conviction of a crime, satisfaction 
or disatisfaction of medical care received, experience with legal matters, and employment 
in the medical field. R. 758, pp. 70-122. 
Near the end of the individual interviews, one prospective juror, Mr. Oldham 
acknowledged that his wife worked for a pediatrician. R. 758, p. 115:21-24. Given that, the 
Alcazars' counsel, with trepidation, did venture to ask whether she had expressed any 
negative feelings about medical malpractice cases and whether he had any feelings about that 
one way or another. Id. 115:25-116:5. Mr. Oldham, however, did not sit as a juror. In fact, 
none of the empaneled jury were asked or revealed anything about their exposure to reports 
or discussion of medical negligence cases. R. 758 p. 132:6-12. Only one of the jurors, 
Bradley Heaton, was even brought back to chambers for individual questioning. Id. and 
116:18-122:12. Thus, a whole jury was allowed to sit in judgment of a medical negligence 
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case without plaintiffs having any knowledge of the jurors' exposure to reports of a medical 
malpractice crisis. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court violated stare decisis and erred by declining to follow the 
holdings in Barrett and Evans. Given the prevalence of reports and discussions of medical 
negligence cases and their impact, the Utah Court of Appeals established the right of 
plaintiffs to voir dire that elicits information about prospective jurors' exposure to and biases 
from such reports. The trial court rejected the Alcazars' Barrett and Evans voir dire and 
determined that the jury would not be exposed to such questioning. The trial court's error 
was prejudicial since the Alcazar's right to intelligent exercise of their peremptory challenges 
was substantially impaired. 
WHEREFORE, the Alcazars respectfully request that the Utah Court of 
Appeals reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial. 
DATED AND SUBMITTED this 30th day of November, 2007. 
Matthew H. Raty, Attorney for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRESCENCIO ALCAZAR AND ] 
MONICA ALCAZAR, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
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UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITALS & ; 
CLINICS, UNIVERSITY OF UTAH ; 
EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT, JON ] 
MIDDLETON, M.D., and STATE OF ; 
UTAH, ; 
Defendants. ] 
) PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED 
) REQUESTED VOIR DIRE OF 
) POTENTIAL JURORS 
) Case No. 030928457 
) Judge: John Paul Kennedy 
Plaintiffs propose the following Voir Dire questions, assuming the court conducts Voir Dire. 
If the court allows attorney Voir Dire, then counsel may ask variations of the following questions: 
Question No. 1. Do you believe a lawsuit is a proper method of resolving disputes 
concerning compensation for negligent medical care? Ostler v. Albina Transfer Company, Inc. ,781 
P.2d 445 (Utah 1989). Please explain [in chambers]. 
Question No. 2. Have any of you watched, read, or heard anything that suggests a 
"lawsuit crisis" or the need for "tort reform"? Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 101 (Utah App. 1993); 
Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991). Please explain [in chambers]. 
a. Do you think the article, program, etc. made some good points? 
b. Did you agree with the points made? Please explain [in chambers]. 
c. Would you be inclined to reduce the damage award, if any, in this case, because of 
what you have watched, read or heard? Please explain [in chambers]. 
Question No. 3, Have any of you watched, read or heard anything which suggests that 
jury verdicts are too high or unreasonable? What have you seen, heard or read? (To be asked of 
jurors in chambers.) 
a. Do you personally believe that jury verdicts are unreasonable? 
b. Do you believe that monetary limits should be placed upon the amounts which a jury 
can award to an individual who sues for personal injuries? 
Question No. 4. Would you be hesitant to award compensation for any of the following 
elements of damages, provided you first find that the plaintiff sustained his burden of proof to be 
entitled to damages: 
1. Past medical expenses? 
2. Pain and suffering including loss of enjoyment of life? 
Question No. 5. Have any of you watched, read, or heard anything to indicate that jury 
verdicts for plaintiffs in personal injury or medical malpractice cases result in higher insurance 
premiums, effect the availability of insurance, or result in higher medical costs for consumers? 
Barrett v. Peterson, 868P.2d 101 (Utah App. 1993); Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991). 
Please explain [in chambers]. 
a. What do you remember about it? Please explain [in chambers]. 
b. Do you think the article, program, etc. made some good points? Please explain [in 
chambers]. 
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c. Do you personally believe that jury verdicts for plaintiffs in personal injury cases 
result in higher insurance premiums or effect the availability of insurance? Please explain [in 
chambers]. Barrett v. Peterson, 868P.2d 101 (Utah App. 1993); Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
Question No. 6. Do you have any negative thoughts or feelings towards those who 
smoke? 
Question No. 7 Would you be less inclined to award damages to someone who suffered 
a heart attack from medical malpractice if that person had been a smoker? 
Question No. 8. Do any of you have any negative feelings about lawyers who seek 
compensation for those who have suffered medical malpractice? Please explain. 
Question No. 9. Do you believe that as a juror you should be able to disregard the law 
and decide a case based on your own beliefs? Please explain. 
Question No. 10. Have you or any of your family ever been, or are you now, a patient 
of Dr. Middleton, Dr. Hartsell or the University of Utah Hospital? If yes, explain who was a patient 
and when? 
Question No. 11. Have you or any of your close relatives or friends worked or do you 
or they now work in any aspect of the insurance industry (insurance salesman, employee of an 
insurance company, adjuster, underwriter, or anything similar)? Please explain. If yes, would that 
effect the way you might view this case? Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991). 
Question No. 12. Have you or any close relatives or friends been involved, or are you 
or they now involved in any way in the health-care industry (e.g., doctor, nurse, employed by a clinic, 
etc.)? Please explain. If yes, would that in any way tend to influence your judgment in this case? 
Explain. 
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Question No. 13, Has any juror here been a party to a civil lawsuit? As a result of that 
experience do you believe that you would be more sympathetic to one party or the other? 
Question No. 14. Is there anyone who cannot put aside private views and concerns and 
deliberate this case using solely the law given to you by the court and the evidence presented by the 
parties? 
Question No. 15. Have you or a close friend or relative ever been sued in a medical 
malpractice lawsuit? Please explain. 
Question No. 16. Is there any juror who feels that his or her religion, expressly or 
impliedly, forbids or discourages a lawsuit brought for money damages as a result of personal 
injuries? [Pursue questions in chambers.] 
Question No. 17 Do you have any negative thoughts or feelings towards individuals 
from Mexico who are living in the United States? 
Question No. 18 Would it be more difficult for you to render a verdict in this case 
because the defendants are the University of Utah Hospitals and Clinics and the State of Utah? 
Question No. 19 If you were either of the parties in this case, would you be 
comfortable knowing that someone like you would be sitting on the jury. 
DATED this 7 day of November, 2006. 
MATTHEW H. RATY 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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1 would make it difficult for you to serve, we ask them about 
2 hardship. And number 17, we would allocate that one in 
3 substance. Number 18, we will explain to them what the 
4 nature of the case is and we'll ask them also if there's a 
5 reason they can't serve. 
6 So that's what I'm going to do with those. Let's 
7 see here, I thought we had some from the plaintiff and I 
8 apparently don't have those with me here for some reason. 
9 MR. RATY: Can I bring you some, Your Honor? 
10 THE COURT: Yeah, if you have a set, bring them up 
11 here and I'll run through them. 
12 MR. RATY: In fact I made just a few additions to 
13 the list I gave you before. So I'm going to give you our 
14 amended one. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 MR. RATY: It's almost entirely the same. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. Number one, I usually give one, 
18 or ask a question that's similar to that. So probably give 
19 I that one in substance. Number two, I don't give that 
20 instruction. Number three, or two b, and c, I wouldn't give 
21 those either as a followup. Number three, I wouldn't give 
22 that one either and I wouldn't give number four, although, I 
23 give an instruction, or I give, I think there's an 
24 instruction as well as a voir_ dire ^ question--that-as^s-theirr 
25 something like, you know, do you have any reason why you 
1 wouldn't be able to award damages if you found that there was 
2 negligence or words to that effect. Number five, I wouldn't 
3 give that one. Number six, that, that I think is an 
4 addition, isn't it? I don't remember seeing that one before. 
5 MR. RATY: Right. 
6 THE COURT: I probably would give that one in this 
7 case. I don't think I would give number seven. I won't give 
8 number eight, but I do give an instruction that tells them 
9 that the lawyers are not on trial here. And we give them an 
10 instruction on number 9 as well as a voir dire question that 
11 asks them if they feel they couldn't follow the instructions. 
12 So give that one in substance. Number 10, we'll ask them if 
13 they have any familiarity with the defendants, including Jon 
14 Middleton, the doctor in this case who as I understand it 
15 who's no longer in the case. I'm not going to give number 
16 11. I will ask them if they have any experience with the 
17 medical profession, and same thing with number 12, I ask that 
18 question in substance, and the same thing with number 13, 
19 number 14, number 15. I ask a question on number 16 that 
20 doesn't focus on religion, but it says do you have any 
21 feelings or beliefs, I think is how it's worded. 
22 Number 17, the problem with that question is this: 
23 people are going to say in answer to it, well, it depends on 
24 whether they're here illegally or not. There's some people 
25 who are going to say that and we can't ask the defendant - or 
1 the plaintiff in this case whether they're here illegally or 
2 not, and because of what the answer is likely to be. So I 
3 don't, I don't want to ask a question that I can't resolve. 
4 I don't want to leave it open and it'll, I think it'll create 
5 more problems than it will resolve. 
6 MR. RATY: Could we fashion something [inaudible] I 
7 believe he's here legally. [inaudible] 
8 THE COURT: I wouldn't count on it. 
9 MR. RATY: We've got a -
10 THE COURT: Have you talked to him about it? 
11 MR. RATY: We've got -
12 THE COURT: Have you seen his papers? 
13 MR. RATY: We've got a State of Utah identification 
14 card for him. 
15 THE COURT: Yeah, yeah. Okay. The, you're just 
16 digging the hole deeper basically when you start going into 
17 stuff like that. And you're, and you're telling the 
18 defendants to start to investigate this guy and find out what 
19 they can find out. I just don't think it's productive one 
20 way or the other. There, there are enough here and we may 
21 even have some on the jury panel. I don't know. We've had 
22 in the past, from, who are Hispanic origin and maybe here 
23 even illegally. Although, they're supposed to be citizens in 
24 f order to serve. But I just ask them_ if_ you^ you know,—are 
25 you a citizen and if they answer yes, I don't probe it, and -
1 MR. RATY: Your Honor, what about a question like 
2 do you have any negative thoughts or feelings towards those 
3 of the Hispanic race and towards Hispanics? 
4 THE COURT: Well, we're gonna ask them if they are, 
5 if they're free from any prejudice, bias, or sympathy, if 
6 they feel that they meet that standard and I'm going to 
7 instruct them on that, and I think that the more you focus on 
8 the issue, the more you make it an issue, I think. So I, if, 
9 if you have any concern during voir dire that someone may 
10 have some bias or prejudices, including a national origin or 
11 any other kind of prohibited bias or prejudice, I'd like you 
12 to raise that and we can call somebody in specifically and 
13 talk to them separately, ask them point blank if you want to 
14 even how they would feel about that. But, you know, my sense 
15 is that you're just going to create problems by starting to 
16 go into this area in a generic kind of way. 
17 And the same thing with number 18, we're basically, 
18 we're identifying who the parties are, asking if they have 
19 any connection or any experiences involving the parties and 
20 so, and then we're asking them if they feel they can, you 
21 know, render a verdict that would be un-influenced by 
22 prejudice or sympathy or bias. So I think we ask that 
23 question. What I would be afraid of is you get somebody from 
24 BYU who raises his hand on that one because he doesn_'tJLike 
25 the XU' or something. I, you know, and I don't, I don't know 
1 that it would matter when it comes down to the ultimate 
2 decision. 
3 And question 19, I ask that in substance. So -
4 I MR. RATY: May I ask about a couple others real 
5 quick? 
6 THE COURT: Sure. 
7 MR. RATY: And are we on the record, or -
8 THE COURT: Yeah, we're on the record. 
9 MR. RATY: Okay, I don't know if we identified 
10 ourselves. I'm Matthew Raty for the plaintiff. 
11 THE COURT: Okay, yes, thank you. Go ahead. Let's 
12 have the appearance of the defendants as well. 
13 MR. WILLIAMS: David Williams and Brad Black for 
14 defendants. 
15 THE COURT: Thank you. 
16 MR. RATY: The first question I had, I didn't hear 
17 you say what you're going to do with number 15. 
18 THE COURT: Number, which number? 
19 MR. RATY: Fifteen. 
20 I THE COURT: I'm going to ask them if they've ever 
21 been a plaintiff or a defendant in a lawsuit, or had a close 
22 friend or relative. So we're going to cover a lot more than 
23 malpractice. We'll cover everything. 
24 MR. RATY: Okay, and then. Your Honor, on the-
25 first, first part questions, which get at prejudice regarding 
1 medical malpractice cases. 
2 THE COURT: I don't know that they get into 
3 prejudice. I think they end up raising issues that most 
4 people don't know about and, and it makes, and suggest things 
5 to people that they may not have considered and I think the 
6 suggestions are not appropriate, so that's why I don't give 
7 them. I don't give them either - they'll submit it typically 
8 by plaintiffs or by defense because I think they're 
9 calculated to try to influence the jury and I don't, I don't 
10 feel that I want to do that. I think you will find as we go 
11 through the questions that I will ask them and they give 
12 their answers that you will be able to tell if there is some 
13 bias or prejudice that would be, that would reflect the kind 
14 of thing that you're concerned about in asking these 
15 questions. So I've never had a lawyer yet who hasn't felt 
16 that he's been able to, or she's been able to ferret that 
17 out. 
18 So I'm, as I said before, when I talked to you 
19 before about your voir dire questions that there's certain 
20 questions that I just don't give that I think are calculated 
21 to influence the jury or to kind of till the soil for you to 
22 sow seeds and I know a lot of lawyers like to do that and I 
23 I think there are probably seminars that tell you how to do 
24 I that and I'm just telling you that irL this case, and other-
25 cases that you might have with me in the future, I won't do 
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1 that. 
2 MR. RATY: Could I - and I don't want to argue with 
3 you on this point, Your Honor -
4 THE COURT: Well then don't. 
5 MR. RATY: Then don't? Can I say one last thing. 
6 THE COURT: If you want to make a record, go ahead. 
7 MR. RATY: Okay, just very briefly, I think there's 
8 a fine balance between suggesting things to the jury pool and 
9 discovering prejudices and biases, which would allow us to 
10 intelligently exercise our peremptory challenges, and I think 
11 that case law, Your Honor, and I've cited several of those 
12 cases, support the need, especially in our present climate so 
13 much discussion about doctors going out of business because 
14 of medical malpractice cases, and -
15 THE COURT: I mean do you want to tell the panel, 
16 are you worried about doctors going out of business because 
17 of medical malpractice? Is that the kind of thought you want 
18 to put in their mind? 
19 MR. RATY: Well, what I'm afraid of is this -
2 0 THE COURT: You want to put in their mind that your 
21 medical costs are going to go up because of, you know, it's 
22 like saying to a kid don't put beans in your ears, you know, 
23 they're going to say, "Hey, that's an idea", you know, and 
2 4 that's what you' re doing *_ a.adL I~ thinJc- it - can- hurt - the 
25 plaintiff as much as it can hurt the defendant and it makes, 
1 it creates kind of a random damage outcome that you can't 
2 predict, and again I've seen enough juries over the last 40 
3 years, that you know, I think I know how they generally react 
4 and I think in this instance, as I said before, you will know 
5 which people to challenge peremptorily by the time we get to 
6 that point. We're going to spend all morning doing that, 
7 probably, and by the end of the, the end of the morning 
8 you're going to know and you'll be able to exercise your 
9 challenges, I think, very intelligently and wisely and I 
10 think it goes for both sides. 
11 MR. RATY: And on that point, Your Honor, are you -
12 THE COURT: What I'll do at the end of these 
13 questions I'll say to you come up here. You'll come up and 
14 I'll say now are there any questions you want to ask that you 
15 feel you haven't had a chance to really get a reaction, and 
16 almost inevitably the lawyers will say no at that point. 
17 Occasionally they'll say, well, juror number 15 said 
18 something about a brother-in-law working for a law office, 
19 could we go into that, or something and we'll pursue that 
20 item. I will often pursue those questions as we're going 
21 along. But if I don't, you can come up and tell me you'd 
22 like to ask somebody about something. So I, you know, don't 
23 be overly concerned about that and I would, you know, again, 
24 I've told you my view on it. So -
25 MR. RATY: Can I ask you about your methodology on-
10 
